Texts, Bodies, and the Memory of Bloody Sunday by Conway, Brian & Spillman, Lyn
 Symbolic Interaction
 
, Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 79–103, ISSN 0195-6086, electronic ISSN 1533-8665. 
© 2007 by the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests
for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s
Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.
 
Direct all correspondence to Lyn Spillman, Department of Sociology, 810 Flanner Hall, University of
Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556; 
 
e-mail
 
: Spillman.1@nd.edu. 
 
Texts, Bodies, and the Memory of Bloody Sunday
 
Lyn Spillman
 
University of Notre Dame
 
Brian Conway
 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
 
We examine here recent arguments that embodied experience is an
important site of collective memory, and related challenges to the
standard emphasis on discourse and symbols in collective memory
research. We argue that although theories of embodied memory offer
new insights, they are limited by (1) an overdrawn distinction between
embodied memory and textual memory that neglects the complex
relations between the two, (2) an overemphasis on ritual performance
at the expense of collective conversation, (3) an oversimplified view of
performativity, and (4) an underestimation of the ambiguity in embod-
ied performance. Theories of embodied collective memory should be
narrowed and specified with focused comparisons examining the
influence of embodied experience in the formation of collective iden-
tities, in conflicts over collective memories, and in the persistence and
malleability of memories across generations. We illustrate our argu-
ment throughout with examples drawn from the collective memory of
Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland in 1972.
 
In what sense, if any, can the body be understood as a site of collective memory? A
strong line of theory and research now argues that embodied experience is a funda-
mental and neglected form of collective memory. However, sociological studies of
collective memory have been slow to engage with and assess this argument, even
though it is potentially relevant to many of the topics we examine. Can claims about
the importance of embodied collective memory sensitize us to examine new angles
on the issues of identity, contestation, and malleability that underpin our empirical
investigations in social memory studies (Olick and Robbins 1998)? What are the
possibilities and limits of these claims? 
Until quite recently, sociology “never successfully posed the question of the body as a
historical issue” (Turner 1991:8). Although social theory does address the contradiction
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between civilization and “natural” inclination, its critique is itself grounded in the
nature-culture binary. And even interactionist traditions in sociology, Turner sug-
gests, tend to follow Mead’s dictum that “we can distinguish very definitely between
the self and the body,” although Goffman’s work could be taken as grounding inves-
tigation into the “performance of the self through medium of the socially interpreted
body” (Mead 1962:136; Turner 1984:140). Overall, “the legitimate rejection of bio-
logical determinism . . . entailed . . . the exclusion of the body from the sociological
imagination” (Turner 1984:31). In contrast, Turner (1991:1–6) elaborates, the “onto-
logical centrality of human embodiment”—and in particular, the phenomenological
notion of “the lived body” (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:8–18)—was more influen-
tial in the development of anthropological presuppositions. However, recent decades
have seen increasing research on the sociology of the body—or, in more expansive
claims, “embodied sociology”—grounded in a more sophisticated, process-oriented
view of the nature-culture binary.
 
1
 
 
But attempts to apply theories of embodiment to accounts of collective memory
face particular challenges beyond sociology’s general theoretical presuppositions
about the nature-culture binary, because of qualities intrinsic to social memory itself.
We think of collective memories as extended in time, or space, or both.
 
2
 
 We also
think of such extensions as accomplished symbolically, if not textually. So, on the
face of it, phenomenologically grounded accounts of bodily memory seem to offer
comparatively poor conceptual resources for understanding the persistence of mean-
ings in history, and their extension in space, compared with accounts relying on more
purely cultural or discursive theories. Two related features of collective memory ex-
acerbate this puzzle. There have been fundamental long-term changes in memory’s
means and mode of production—changes indexed in the oppositions between orality
and literacy, face-to-face and imagined community, tradition and organized (often
state-generated) construction—perhaps, “memory” and “history” (Olick and Rob-
bins 1998:112–15). These tectonic shifts seem to reduce the potential importance of
bodies as sites—or “techne”—of collective memory: as memory is made in new
ways, for instance in “media ritual events” (Dayan and Katz 1992), it seems their rel-
ative significance could only decline further. Finally, text and representation are the
primary modes of access to our object for students of collective memory, even where
we are pushing, theoretically, to get beyond an understanding in terms of static tex-
tual structure to attend to memory as a process, to the variant reception of textual
memory, to the pragmatic moment. Even where we examine the performative, as in
studies of ritualized collective memory, we mostly read rituals as texts. So the issue
of embodiment poses an important but neglected set of theoretical issues for sociolo-
gists concerned with collective memory. 
Our primary aim here is to introduce, explore, and assess the case that has been
made for the significance of embodied memory. To focus our theoretical discussion,
though, we draw on the memory of “Bloody Sunday” in Northern Ireland. On
January 30, 1972, in a predominantly Catholic area of Derry, thirteen people were killed
and fourteen injured by British paratroopers during a peaceful march against the
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policy of internment. The political situation was particularly charged at the time, and
the march was one of many: this event, though, became a watershed in the popular
memory of “The Troubles.”
 
3
 
 A rapidly conducted official inquiry exonerated the British
soldiers involved, though, in the late 1990s, continued popular criticism and new
evidence assembled by the Irish government prompted a new inquiry. In contrast to
official memory, the contesting popular memory of the event has been richly elabo-
rated in many forms: murals, monuments, archives, museums, books, memoirs, film,
posters, and speeches (Conway 2005). Most important here, though, an annual com-
memorative reenactment of the original march has been organized for over thirty
years. We draw on this case not only to illustrate some insights offered by theories of
embodied collective memory but also to specify problems they generate.
In the next section, we examine the case that has been made for the importance
of embodied collective memory, beginning with some illustrations and summarizing
the main theoretical arguments grounding them. Because of their influence, we pay
particular attention to Paul Connerton’s widely cited arguments for embodied
memory in 
 
How Societies Remember
 
. We then draw on interviews with participants
in the commemorative march for a brief illustration of what this perspective illumi-
nates about the popular memory of Bloody Sunday and what it does not address.
Against this background, we analyze Connerton’s theoretical argument in more
depth and, finally, return to the Bloody Sunday case to detail its limitations.
Overall, we conclude that sociologists should be cautious about arguments that
embodied memory is key to collective memory—what we label here “the strong em-
bodiment thesis.” This caution seems necessary because advocates of this thesis make
too sharp a distinction between incorporated or embodied memory and textual or
discursive memory, and ignore the complex relations between them. Although em-
bodied memory can be significant for collective memory when body use in action
intensifies the communicative potential for recognition (Frank 1991:89), the strong
embodiment thesis offers no way to theorize how bodily memories are always already
inscribed, organized, and symbolized. 
 
THE STRONG EMBODIMENT THESIS
 
What does it mean to locate social memory in the body? In Lee’s (2000) analysis,
for instance, the bodies of first-generation Korean migrants in Japan are the site of a
sort of ethnic memory in that their tastes in food express their ethnic identification:
for instance, eating authentic, spicy kimchi. Lee’s understanding of bodily memory is
built on Scheper-Hughes and Lock’s (1987) model of the “mindful body” and Bour-
dieu’s extension of Mauss’s notion of habitus, and she emphasizes how bodily mem-
ory “acts as a source of meaning-making and a process of negotiation” (Lee 2000,
206). As one elderly Korean articulates: “My stomach and heart ache together from
even just smelling Korean food, because it brings back all the hardship I have suffered
in my life. Even if I wanted to forget, I cannot. My body has absorbed the past like a
sponge. Forgetting is an impossibility” (p. 216). Of course, food tastes are familiar
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ethnic markers—a sign, for instance, of the “costless community” that Waters
(1990:118–21) finds in her study of third- and fourth-generation whites exercising
“ethnic options” in the United States. But Lee’s argument is stronger here: for Korean
migrants, eating authentic kimchi is a form of resistance to attempts in Japanese society
to erase their culture. In this case, bodily habits, tastes, or practices sustain a subordinate
collective memory, and the body is a particularly important resource for those who
lack other means.
The body is also an important site of subordinated memories in Gibbons’s reflec-
tions on popular memory in Ireland around the time of the centennial of the 1798
rebellion. Taking 
 
Ulysses
 
 and other of James Joyce’s writings as his texts, Gibbons
(2001:145) shows “the reverberations of the past” entering the body “at a somatic
level.” He sets the figure of the 
 
flâneur
 
 encountering the heterogeneous temporal
elements coexisting in Dublin against the figure of the monument, which fixes official
history. Walking in the city, he argues, Joyce’s characters move through time as well
as space, but in dislocated, preconscious ways that may differ from their conscious
intentions and attitudes. Somatic memory is involuntary memory triggered by
movement in space, the chance observation of a building here or a building there.
For one character in 
 
Ulysses
 
, Kernan, “the wayward sentiments precipitated by the
physical act of walking are at odds with his official deference towards colonial rule,
as if his body doesn’t know what his mind is doing”
 
 
 
(p. 153). Nevertheless, Gibbons
argues, the “jarring perceptual strategies of the colonial 
 
flaneur
 
 were all too aware
of the nightmare of history and could not but register the reawakening of the nation
as it attempted to throw off the dead weight of imperial torpor” (p. 150). This is a
sort of Foucauldian “subjugated knowledge,” existing alongside but perhaps also en-
ergizing the more formal cultural organizations and movements of the period that
culminated in the Easter Rising of 1916. Whereas Lee points to bodily practices that
consciously sustain subordinate collective memory, Gibbons suggests that they can
generate a subconscious sense of history that conflicts with official versions. 
Similarly, Stoller (1994:642, 641) examines contemporary spirit possession ceremo-
nies of the Songhay people of Niger and Mali and argues that “spirit possession is an
incontestably embodied phenomenon that triggers a myriad of cultural memories”—
countermemories “stored in movement, in posture, in gesture, in sound, odor and
taste—in the flesh.” Each spirit family represents a period in Songhay history (which
is also recorded—though less powerfully according to Stoller—in text and oral epics).
For instance, the Hauka spirits “mimic colonial personages”
 
 
 
(p. 664) and date from
1925. In his analysis, Stoller challenges anthropological accounts of spirit possession
in terms of functionalism, psychoanalysis, textual interpretation, and so on, and builds
on Bourdieu’s notion of embodied taste, among other sources, to critique the heavy
bias toward text and discourse in the social sciences. He also wants to go beyond the
sort of limited recognition of embodiment in which the body is just another sort of
text, views that “strip the body of its smells, tastes, texture, and pain” (p. 637). Stoller
also argues that embodied memory, by contrast to textual memory, is the site of criti-
cal, subordinate collective memory: “Spirit possession ceremonies spark Songhay
counter-memories, which are . . . stored . . . in the flesh” (p. 65).
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The elderly Korean in Japan, the Dublin 
 
flâneur
 
, the Songhay possessed by the
spirit of a colonial governor: these can stand here for a strong embodiment thesis,
the argument that social memory is carried in the body and that this sort of memory
is consequential even alongside textual and monumental representation. The Korean
example touches on themes of both identity and contestation; the Dublin example
suggests that bodily memory may constitute a sort of prepolitical (in Hobsbawm’s
terms) memory that exists alongside and may animate more typically textual and
organizational dimensions of memory politics; and the Songhay example raises issues
of malleability and persistence, seeming to suggest that bodily memory may cross
generations, transcending the limits of the body itself. 
This strong embodiment thesis—viewing memory from the point of view of a
“phenomenally-experienced individual body-self” (Scheper-Hughes and Lock
1987:6)—should be distinguished from two weaker versions more congenial to
existing social memory studies. As Scheper-Hughes and Lock discuss, the body is
also important as a symbol and as an object of social control. The former approach
simply reminds us of the many ways bodies can be just another sort of text, how
clothing, food tastes, postures, and so forth can 
 
represent
 
. The latter approach ex-
amines how bodies and bodily experience are themselves influenced by macro-social
processes of reproduction and regulation and micro-social processes of restraint
and representation (Turner 1984:85–114). For instance, Igarashi’s study of Japan’s
remembrance of World War II emphasizes the importance of the discursively con-
structed body as a symbol of national identity, tracing representations of the body
through various postwar genres. Moreover, this “discursively constructed body”
derived plausibility from the wartime regime’s attempts to “create obedient, na-
tionalist bodies by forging ties between nationalist ideology and bodily functions”
(Igarashi 2000:13). In this account, the body as representation and the body as ob-
ject of social control are linked. However, neither of these conceptualizations re-
lies on the phenomenological experience of the body-self that grounds versions of
the strong embodiment thesis.
 
4
 
 We focus on the latter thesis here because it pre-
sents the most puzzling challenge to sociologists and historians working on collec-
tive memory.
Stoller (1997:xvi) has made this challenge strongest and most explicit, using his
studies of the Songhay to argue that “memory (and history) is an embodied phe-
nomenon.” He emphasizes that “embodiment is not primarily textual, that the hu-
man body is not principally a text; rather, it is consumed by a world filled with
smells, textures, sights, sounds, and tastes, all of which spark cultural memories”
(p. 85), and criticizes other scholarship on the body for persisting in ignoring the
sensuous. But his argument remains ambiguous in its intended range: while Stoller
sometimes seems to extend his critique to all collective memory, he implicitly limits
it, elsewhere, to the memory of repression, to history from below, and to forms of
perception in non-Western societies. This ambiguity raises important questions
about the theoretical generality of the strong embodiment thesis because of the
well-recognized historical shifts in forms and technologies of collective memory
mentioned above.
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A broader application of the strong embodiment thesis has been argued most
forcefully and influentially by Paul Connerton, in 
 
How Societies Remember
 
, a theo-
rization that explicitly authorizes the studies above, as well as many others. For
Connerton, as for Flyvbjerg (2001), the social sciences are too obsessed with “viewing
particular instances of behavior as the application of social rules” (Connerton 1989:29).
This flaw, he argues, is characteristic of scholars as diverse as Winch (on moral action
as rule governed) and Sahlins (on clothing as a system structured like a language).
Thus Connerton wants to challenge an overemphasis on what he calls 
 
inscribed
 
memory throughout the social sciences. 
 
Habit
 
 memory, he says, has been neglected,
although forgetting a habit is different from forgetting an event or forgetting a cogni-
tion. A ritual, for instance, is not just a symbolic representation of something else,
not simply a text that needs decoding, but a matter of bodily repetition that is both
performative and mnemonic. The importance of the body extends further. “Incorpo-
rated practices” in ceremonies, proprieties (such as bodily etiquette), and techniques
(such as gestures) involve more than cognitive memory, and, Connerton argues, they
are mnemonics for a sort of knowledge that does not exist independent of perfor-
mance. In contrast to most of those who, like Stoller, have used his ideas since, Con-
nerton (1989:102) suggests that this sort of memory may in fact be more conservative
than discursive memory, which is more easily questioned, and his illustrations are often
drawn from dominant cultures: for instance, “those practices through which the
French nobility of the seventeenth century displayed their privileged status” are
used to illustrate the force of “ceremonies of the body” (p. 84).
The strong embodiment thesis, then, points to a form of memory beyond discourse
and symbols, arguing that this memory should be brought to the center of scholarly
attention. How does the memory of Bloody Sunday look when we use this lens?
 
BLOODY SUNDAY AND THE STRONG EMBODIMENT THESIS 
 
In the 1992 documentary, 
 
The Bloody Sunday Murders
 
, a young woman faces the
camera and begins to tell the story: “I want to tell you the truth about Bloody
Sunday. . . . I was two years old at the time but like everyone else in the community
I lived with the memory of it. . . . the memory is still as raw today as it ever was”
(Gibbons 1998:102). And indeed, the popular memory of Bloody Sunday in Derry
and more generally in Northern Ireland is widespread and powerful and has been
highly elaborated in various forms over thirty years. There are some good reasons to
think that embodied memory could be important in accounting for this power. 
First, the “official” denial or silence about the traumatic meaning of the events in
subordinate memory makes this case similar to other case studies on embodied col-
lective memory, like that of the Koreans in Japan mentioned earlier (Lee 2000; see
also Kleinman and Kleinman 1994; Skultans 1999). Second, embodied memory
should also be particularly significant in the Bloody Sunday case because a number
of studies have shown that, more generally, Catholic and Protestant group identities
in Northern Ireland are systematically encoded in embodied practices in ways that
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sustain those identities. For instance, Kelleher (2003:56) found that his informants in
a town in the west of Northern Ireland “mapped their social world through their
moving bodies. Those moves were acts of memorization, forms of practical con-
sciousness, and they elicited narration.” The colonial past was articulated partly “in
the practical consciousness that guided their bodies through space” (p. 59). Beyond
these informal incorporated practices, too, there is also a strong tradition of more
formal ceremonial parades in Northern Ireland, parades that create and sustain dif-
ference, and articulate critique and legitimation (Bryan 2000; Conway 2005:114–16;
Jarman 1997). 
So, because of official silence, and also because of this well-recognized encoding
of Catholic and Protestant identities in embodied practices in Northern Ireland, this
is a case where we might expect embodied memory to play a significant role. And in-
deed there is some evidence that for those who experienced the 1972 events memory
is, in part, visceral. As one relative of a victim says, “I live and breathe Bloody
Sunday. . . . you feel like you’re carrying this baggage around with you” (Gartner
1998:126). Some march participants’ extended reflections include poignant evidence
that the bodily repetition of the commemorative marches is an important site of
memory, among others. For one participant, and much like Gibbons’s Dublin 
 
flâneur
 
,
“memories come flooding back” when he retraced his footsteps on the march’s
twenty-fifth anniversary, and he elaborates in detail his experience of that day in 1972,
continuing:
 
So he ran, we ran, we continued on over Glenfada Park over to Lisfannon Park
and we stood there, we heard the roaring and the shouting and all of a sudden we
heard the shots. . . . and this went on for what seemed like an eternity. . . . me and
Harry went down and we found one of the men was lying, his name was Barney
McGuigan, he had been shot in the head, he had gone out with a white handker-
chief to help a person who had been hurt. . . . and of course the paratroop regiment
had come in at William Street over by the lovely church there the Presbyterian
church and they were all around the Bogside. . . . So it was an absolutely terrible
time. It felt as if, you know. . . . it was January. . . . it was quite a cold day and a
little bit wet but it felt after we heard the news all those people had been killed
and injured as if the clouds had come down, the dark clouds, and they were just
hanging above your head, the whole city was quiet.
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For another informant, too, “all those memories come flooding back” on the annual
commemorative march:
 
It is a very emotional thing for me. I don’t think I can convey adequately. . . . The
last march, for example, and I normally walk alone. I don’t walk with other people.
I walk alone and I like to reflect. And I remember as I . . . I remember the day so
well. It is a carnival now. . . . That wasn’t like what it was like on the day. . . . It is a
most nauseating thing. And I don’t think I will ever forget the feeling in my
stomach when I realized for the first time that they were using lead. I hadn’t seen
lead used before. I was involved in all sorts of protests and things . . . so I
couldn’t believe they were using lead. Twenty thousand people . . . men, women
and children. And here they were using lead and it was skipping off the ground.
And then, the reality, this awful coldness that comes over you, that here we are,
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they’re dead, there on the street, they’re dead, their skulls are burst open and
grey matter is coming out. And they are lying there.
 
And another observes: 
 
I don’t think I have ever personally, emotionally recovered . . . from the events of
Bloody Sunday. . . . and I think most of the people who were there at that time
have not recovered from it. . . . and the first few times I went to the march and
even yet . . . we gather in Creggan when the march starts off. . . . And we go down
the hill from Creggan. . . . sometimes I can feel the hair on the back of me neck
because it brings back so many memories you know. . . . and I always remember
the first, the original march on the first day. 
 
For these participants, then, at least one dimension of the memory of Bloody
Sunday seems to be experientially located in the “phenomenally-experienced
individual body-self” as evoked in the embodied repetition of the annual com-
memorative march. Theorists of embodiment as a site of collective memory seem
right to draw attention to this neglected experiential power. But the existence of
these experiences does not guarantee their generality or significance for collec-
tive memories. 
Raw experiences like the ones above are not commonly reported. While this may
be partly because of implicit norms defining them as irrelevant to discussion of
Bloody Sunday, it seems more likely, in this case, that the experience of another
longtime marcher is at least as common, if not more so: 
 
The Bloody Sunday march doesn’t for me any more because it is over the same
route. . . . it goes on far too long the route of the bloody march for mid-winter . . .
so I don’t. . . . I mean I feel a lot of emotion for Bloody Sunday when I’m listen-
ing to the evidence at the Saville Tribunal or simply when I think about it . . . but
on the march no, no I don’t actually . . . it’s a . . . let me say it is a political cam-
paigning that I’m in. 
 
For this respondent, the most common meaning of the commemorative march was its
political meaning. Understandings of participation in the commemorative march as
“a means to an end” and “a show of support” were much more common than under-
standings centered on what Connerton would call habit memory: “It is the biggest
sort of public statement if you will of people. . . . It reflects the feeling of the time.”
Even where physical reenactment and copresence carry significant personal meaning,
their importance is understood in terms of signification, the body as another sort of
sign, rather than as phenomenologically evocative for memory production:
 
People can show their support though the march. . . . The march was vital, it still
is vital to put across the support for the families in relation to what they were
trying to achieve. . . . People identify themselves with the families as well and be
on the march, and see the families and listen to the platform and be able to say
to their own families I was there. That’s important. Because it was important to
educate the world in relation to what happened on Bloody Sunday too as well. If
you look at it on a yearly basis, in the last ten, twelve years, it has actually been
carried on TV.
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Even though a few informants speak powerfully of embodied memory, then,
many more understand their experience as a signifying practice, supporting only a
weaker understanding of embodied habit as a form of collective memory. This sug-
gests that we need to reexamine the place of discursive practices in theories of em-
bodied collective memory.
 
BEYOND THE STRONG EMBODIMENT THESIS
 
A good deal of the impact of the embodied memory arguments of Stoller, Connerton,
and others derives from their negative argument about the supposedly undue focus
of the social sciences on inscription, on decoding, on rule, and on language. However,
as the discussion above begins to suggest, and even setting aside collective memories
that take purely discursive forms, like books and museums, those memories embod-
ied in habitual, repetitive practices are often experienced mostly as signifiers. We
are left wondering, then, about the relationship between bodily and inscribed memory,
about whether the inscribed memories most collective memory studies are con-
cerned with are in fact of little consequence, as the critique of an overemphasis on
inscription implies.
We are left wondering about the relation between inscribed and embodied memory
because the structure of Connerton’s (1989:4–5) argument involves “a progressive
narrowing of focus”: 
 
If there is such a thing as social memory . . . we are likely to find it in commemo-
rative ceremonies; but commemorative ceremonies prove to be commemorative
only in so far as they are performative; performativity cannot be thought with-
out a concept of habit; and habit cannot be thought without a notion of bodily
automatisms. (See also p. 71)
 
But this overall argument, stated so absolutely, invites doubt for four reasons.
Most relevant to our issues here, “social memory” may exist beyond commemo-
rative ceremony—in historical reconstruction, symbolism, and oral history, for in-
stance, as well as in texts, images, monuments, museums, and so on. Connerton
draws a sharp and somewhat idealized procedural distinction between formal history
and social memory. While recognizing instances in which they mutually influence
each other, he wants to preserve the realm of social memory for “more procedurally
informal and more culturally diffused” narratives of the past (Connerton 1989:16).
Yet whether our awareness and understanding of aspects of the past derive origi-
nally from the formal work of historians seems immaterial to their significance,
especially in complex literate societies, since there is a strong empirical relation be-
tween more procedurally formal and more informal memory construction
processes. So, for instance, the work of professional historians can evoke—and
change—more informal social memories (Spillman 1997), and, conversely, informal
understandings of the past can influence the work of professional historians
(Schwartz 2005). The interrelations between formal, “inscribed” histories, commemora-
tive ceremony, and informal social memories are more complex than Connerton allows.
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Indeed, many contemporary commemorative ceremonies have an impact on informal
social memory through inscription, as much as performance, especially if they are
conducted in ways that extend the experience in space and time—as the significance
of the TV broadcasts to the participant above suggests.
Oral histories also seem to challenge Connerton’s limitation of “social memory”
to commemorative ceremony: indeed, before moving to his central arguments about
bodily habit and memory, he treats oral histories as the prototype of “social” as op-
posed to “formal historical” memory (1989:17–21). He does not pursue the signifi-
cance of oral histories, but they do not seem to fit his claims that social memory is
essentially ceremonial. In village life, as opposed to urban contexts, he points out, daily
recounting and gossip mean that “the village informally constructs a continuous
communal history of itself: a history in which everybody portrays, in which every-
body is portrayed, and in which the act of portrayal never stops” (p. 17). And even
where oral history is constructed in collective performances, as in the “ceili” Glassie
(1982:chap. 3) describes in a late-twentieth-century Ulster village, these perfor-
mances are too contingent and informal to be usefully labeled “ceremonial.” 
So, contrary to Connerton’s account, social memory extends significantly beyond
commemorative ceremony. Nevertheless, Connerton is right to emphasize the per-
formative core of such ceremony and thus stress the importance of performativity
where collective memory is embedded in commemorative ritual. However, he under-
stands performativity as an intrinsic, invariant connection between the ceremonial per-
formance and the social memory performed: “It is intrinsic to the nature of rituals—
but not of myths—that they specify the relationship that obtains between the perfor-
mance of the ritual and what it is that the participants are performing”; therefore,
“the structure of rituals has significantly less potential for variance” (Connerton
1989:57). Performativity in ritual is thus understood as “encoded” in actors’ invariant
utterances, postures, gestures, and movements; habit and the body are the true carriers
of collective memory.
Yet this understanding of ritual ignores important elements of performance,
oversimplifying conditions for its success—and thus for the successful persistence of
collective memories embedded in ceremony. As Alexander (2004) argues, the con-
ditions of ritual performance include not only the actor (and her utterances, pos-
tures, gestures, and movements) but shared systems of collective representations,
observers/audiences, means of symbolic production, mis-en-scène, and social
power. Whether these conditions are successfully fused is contingent and becomes
much more contingent in complex, differentiated societies. This more nuanced the-
ory suggests that the importance of the actor’s “body-self” as an experiential and
representational carrier of collective memory is significantly overestimated in Con-
nerton’s identification of commemorative performativity with bodily habit. Bodily
memory is certainly not sufficient to account for social memory (even if we restrict
social memory to commemorative ceremony), because the ceremonial “encoding”
of the past also relies on, and may be evident in, other performative conditions be-
sides the embodied actor.
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If embodied, habitual memory cannot provide a sufficient account of social mem-
ory, is it at least necessary to any such account? Connerton suggests that ritual physi-
cal enactment intensifies and clarifies meaning in ways that are not possible when
memory is inscribed, and thus it remains an essential grounding even in complex,
literate societies. For him, ritualized physical enactment is inculcating and unambiguous
in a way no text could be: “The limited resources of ritual posture, gesture, and move-
ment strip communication clean of many hermeneutic puzzles” (Connerton 1989:59).
The implication is that authentic collective memory is necessarily embodied, and in-
scribed memories are essentially weaker, more challengeable, and more changeable: 
 
Both commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices . . . contain a measure
of insurance against the process of cumulative questioning entailed in all dis-
cursive practice. This is the source of their importance and persistence as mne-
monic systems. Every group, then, will entrust to bodily automatisms the val-
ues and categories which they are most anxious to conserve. They will know
how well the past can be kept in mind by a habitual memory sedimented in the
body. (P. 102) 
 
While recognizing the epochal shifts in memory’s means and mode of production
that occurred with literacy and increasing social complexity, Connerton suggests
that bodily, habitual memory remains essential to preserving collective memory.
Yet this claim relies on arguments that embodied memories involve a sort of predis-
cursive transparency and transgenerational immutability that seem hard to sustain. An
actor’s postures, gestures, and movements are as much potential sources of “herme-
neutic puzzles” and ambiguity—both to themselves as performers and to their
audiences—as are the textual elements they draw on, and thus just as vulnerable to
performative failure and “cumulative questioning.” Geertz (1973:6–7) memorably
introduces his “interpretive theory of culture” with a riff on Ryle’s example of boys
rapidly contracting their eyelids—embodied significance that rapidly decomposes into
multiple possibilities of “twitches, winks, fake-winks, parodies, [and] rehearsals of par-
odies.”
 
6
 
 Even embodied experience will not guarantee the performative success of the
idealized commemorative ritual—and the openness of embodied habit to variant inter-
pretation would be multiplied in its generational transmission. Conversely, embodied
memory may be a relatively unimportant element in successful commemoration,
which, as noted above, depends on the fusion of a range of performative conditions
rather than any single element. Indeed, it is possible to imagine successful commemo-
ration that reduces the significance of the actor’s embodied experience to his or her
presence before a camera, structured interaction with exhibits at a museum, or capacity
to download a memorial Web site simultaneously with other group members.
 
DISCOURSE, ORGANIZATION, AND EMBODIMENT
IN THE MEMORY OF BLOODY SUNDAY
 
So despite implications to the contrary, Connerton’s argument does not in itself un-
dermine approaches to collective memory that focus on and assume the importance of
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“inscribed” memories. By drawing an unsustainable distinction between formal, in-
scribed history and memorial performance, overemphasizing commemorative cere-
mony at the expense of oral history, invoking a notion of performativity that is too thin
and essentialist, and underestimating the potential ambiguity in embodied, habitual
performance, Connerton oversimplifies and exaggerates the distinction he is drawing
between inscribed and embodied memory. We can illustrate these issues by attending
to some of the many ways the few reports of embodied memory of Bloody Sunday
noted above are embedded in and made possible by their discursive and organiza-
tional context.
It is important to emphasize, first, that although Bloody Sunday was officially
ignored for over thirty years, and although the commemorative march has been a
centerpiece of contesting popular memory, this memory has also been richly elabo-
rated in many inscribed forms, as noted above. Some of these sites of memory are
indistinguishable from the sorts of formal history that Connerton claims are less
authentic and less powerful than embodied social memory. In this context, it becomes
impossible to make any sharp empirical distinction between, or to assign relative
importance to, embodied performance and inscribed history. And experientially,
inscribed history inheres in embodied performance. 
Thus, for one marcher mentioned above, for whom walking in the annual event
generates “a flood of memories,” part of the experience is centered on the concen-
tration of symbols: 
 
I go on the march and I get into company with people and we just do the route
and of course we watch the sort of ’em. . . . they made up certain hoardings you
know. . . . Photographs, large photographs of the thirteen people who were mur-
dered on that particular day. . . . so they would all be around the Creggan estate . . .
you would watch them. And there would be a lot of graffiti around, a lot of flags
and things like that.
 
For another participant, “the march is only part of the commemoration. . . . but it is
in one sense the most meaningful . . . because it is the biggest and because it is a
public statement and . . . specifically the march where they lay the crosses on the
monument. . . . I find that quite moving.” Indeed, for yet another, monuments are
not simply “official history” (in the contrast drawn by Gibbons) but an obviously
popular site of memory: “The notion that there should be a monument to the dead
of Bloody Sunday was an obvious one. . . . in a country of monuments . . . we’re not
the only country like that in a period of struggles.” Yet another links his evaluation
of the most successful march to the publication of a book: 
 
I think probably the major march was the 25th, the 20th or the 25th anniversary,
it may have been the 20th, it was the year that Don Mullan’s book . . . it was the
year his book came out . . . and that was very significant. . . . I talked with a very
good friend of mine . . . who is a lecturer. . . . and he told me the only way you
can be sure that this is going to be preserved is get a book published. . . . when
the historian comes to do his research he will consult the library and get his in-
formation.
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Symbols are important to the experiential memory here: the sharp distinction that
Connerton and others draw between embodied and inscribed memory cannot be
sustained, and “formal” history is bound in multistranded reciprocal relations with
“social memory.”
Second, Connerton’s ultimate focus on ceremony, excluding oral history, is also
difficult to sustain. For one march participant with “you know flashbacks of particu-
lar circumstances involved,” such flashbacks were triggered by conversation gener-
ated by the organization of Bloody Sunday events, by “people talking to one
another . . . by people attending the Bloody Sunday events in and around the week
of Bloody Sunday.” For this man, as for others, the mobilizations surrounding
Bloody Sunday events—including books, films, and museums, as well as the
march—brought private memories to the surface of collective conversation. A process
in which Bloody Sunday commemorative organization triggers collective conversa-
tion is also evident in memory transmission: 
 
A lot of young people . . . want to know what happened on Bloody Sunday. Ok it is
a new generation but the same stories are carried down the line—you know what
happened on Bloody Sunday Dad, were you there on Bloody Sunday, and so on. . . .
But we must remember also that Bloody Sunday is in their face, in relation to the
[Saville] Inquiry, because it is in the newspapers every week, is on the TV every
night, and so they are being educated about Bloody Sunday. And through their
mentors or elder generation they are being told about Bloody Sunday.
 
Third, even if we focus only on ceremonial performance, as Connerton ulti-
mately does, the ceremonial encoding of the Bloody Sunday memory is conditioned
by important organizational and discursive factors that seem to reduce significantly
the importance of the actors’ body-self for the memory in that performance. Even
the first commemorative reenactments took place against an explicit background
history of intensive organization and of various and sometimes competing discur-
sive frames. 
One central figure recounts at great length the history of civil rights activism and
conflict in Derry in the years leading up to Bloody Sunday, noting a variety of activ-
ist groups and traditions and elaborating on the strong activist organization of the
period:
 
So Derry Citizens Action took on the entire civil rights function. It was well or-
ganized, well disciplined. . . . we had an army of stewards which we trained of
about 1,500. These 1,500 stewards were trained by the Derry Citizen Action
Committee. After meetings held five nights a week in little halls all over the
place where the philosophy of Gandhi and Martin Luther King was expounded.
. . . and we were training, inculcating people into how we organized marches and
how we stop people from engaging in violence.
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As another informant noted, “The Bloody Sunday issue wasn’t, wasn’t a stand-
alone issue in those years in the way that it subsequently became.”
In the 1980s the organization of the march came to be dominated by Sinn Féin,
which “mobilizes every year and brings quite a lot of people. . . . stewards for the
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march are not formally organized by Sinn Féin it just tends naturally to be Sinn Féiners
who come forward to offer themselves as stewards.” As noted below, Sinn Féin’s orga-
nization of the march was contested, but even one critic points out that “in fairness to
Sinn Féin if they hadn’t taken on that role and organized the march . . . it probably
would never have developed into the massive demonstration it did develop into.”
Beyond these organizational conditions, the 
 
meaning
 
 of the march was also al-
ways already inscribed in preexisting discursive frames. Bloody Sunday “immedi-
ately fitted into the pattern of” other events—“Bloody Friday and some other mas-
sacres. . . . there was another Bloody Sunday in 1920,” so “the distinctive reaction, if
you like, of both communities in Northern Ireland was to react in traditional ways.”
Discourse and inscription were important even before the first commemorative
march. The British government’s official Widgery report had exonerated the soldiers
involved in 1972, but even by 1973, several legal critiques had been written. One cri-
tique was written for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which
was an important march organizer in the first decade. Other forms of “inscription”
were already evident early, including several critical songs and poems, extensive press
discussion, and planning of a memorial (Conway 2005). In the month leading up to
the 1973 commemoration, the march was extensively advertised, with printed lists of
the names of the dead. The memory of Bloody Sunday was always already inscribed.
And contrary to Connerton’s claims, the meaning of that memory was never un-
ambiguous, but understood in very different ways, in a discursive field structured by
dichotomies between peace and violence, constitutional and armed struggle, per-
sonal memory and public claim. From the beginning, memory “entrepreneurs”
competed over the interpretation of the commemoration. In the early years, a num-
ber of social movement organizations laid claim to the memory of the Bloody Sun-
day dead. NICRA and Sinn Féin were the most significant. Between about 1973 and
1978 NICRA and Sinn Féin held different and sometimes directly competing com-
memorations. The NICRA commemorations were smaller and more directly at-
tuned to victims’ families while promoting democracy and nonviolence. The Sinn
Féin commemorations appealed to the memory of the Bloody Sunday dead to vali-
date Republican goals and unite Republicans (Conway 2005).
In 1973, in fact, two rival marches were held on the same day. NICRA organized a
march supported by families of victims—intended to be nonpartisan, silent, without
banners and flags, and ending with a wreath laying. NICRA pamphlets, promotions,
and organizational records all stressed similar themes: “Remembering that the original
march was held as a peaceful demonstration, we must ensure that, in accordance with
that ideal, this commemoration shows an example of dignity and respect to the world
or else we reject the principles of those who died and we discredit their memory”
(
 
Derry Journal 
 
1973:1). About two thousand attended. By contrast, the significantly
larger Sinn Féin march, attended by about seven thousand people, included marching
bands, banners, flags, and speeches, encouraged marchers to support the Irish Repub-
lican Army (IRA) and the armed struggle, and challenged policies of internment and
special courts. A year later, public notices in the 
 
Derry Journal
 
 in January in memory
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of the dead expressed these contrasting meanings. For Sinn Féin, the march was in
memory of the dead “butchered by the 1st Batt. Britain’s Parachute Regiment.” But
for the civil rights association, a commemorative march was held because “13 Died for
Their Rights and Yours Two Years Ago in Derry” (
 
Derry Journal
 
 1974). 
After about 1978, Sinn Féin was the main organizer of commemoration until the
early nineties. But competing meanings played later, too, in ongoing commentary and
challenge to Sinn Féin’s dominance. Public criticism of its more radical, politicized in-
terpretation of the memory continued unabated. Some of those who had been
present at the original events withdrew from participation: as one family member said
in 1978, “No way will I allow anyone to use Barney’s name to justify more killing. . . .
no one’s ever asked the families if their names could be used in support of more
violence” (
 
Sunday World
 
 1978). Summarizing the competing positions, one article
suggested that “some will accuse the march organizers of misusing the memory of the
dead, while others maintain that such a show of defiance is the only adequate memorial”
(
 
Sunday World
 
 1978).
These competing meanings structure and dominate participants’ understandings of
the meaning in the commemorative march over the years, making collective memory
embodied in the commemorative march much more ambiguous than Connerton’s
argument would suggest. On one understanding, for instance, the number of people at-
tending the march was an indicator of support for republicanism and the IRA: as one
participant wrote, “I had a feeling of low morale which has always accompanied such
marches, about the size of the turn-out. Would it be a smaller march than last year?
Would a low turnout mean something sinister, and would the press read into it the de-
feat of the I.R.A.?!!!” (Boyle 1978). For an opponent of Sinn Féin, on the other hand, 
 
Sinn Féin strategy has been to hijack everything in sight, including history. The
march we have now . . . there are bands. . . . I don’t agree with that at all. . . . one
of the things which I ask myself is . . . are these people true republicans? Well
you see I don’t believe they are. I think they are Nationalists. And part of that is
that we mirror some of the Loyalist type demonstrations. So you have bands. . . .
There is too much of a carnival thing with a band. I think that should be a civil
rights march. . . . if there had to be any type of music we should be singing the
civil rights anthem—We Shall Overcome—we sang that that day. 
 
For another,
 
It was a Sinn Féin organized march. I always went to it . . . and lots of other peo-
ple did. . . . I made the argument at the time that . . . if we didn’t march we were
simply leaving the issue to Sinn Féin . . . and that wasn’t right either. . . . I think
the extent to which Sinn Féin does dominate the march is a bad thing . . . not be-
cause it is Sinn Féin but because it is difficult to explain that the Bloody Sunday
itself is not simply a Nationalist issue. . . . when these forces of the State come
into an area and kill its citizens that is everybody’s concern.
 
In contrast to Connerton’s claims, too, but as many other studies of collective
memory would suggest, the history of the march shows a marked presentism, with
changing themes and claims according to changing contemporary concerns (Olick
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and Robbins 1998; Spillman 2003). Not only is the demeanor and affect of the orig-
inal march irrecoverable, and the surrounding physical environment and route of
the march changed, but, more important for Connerton’s claims about the persis-
tence of embodied collective memory, banners and slogans reflect political griev-
ances and demands of the day. At various times, the march emphasized different
contemporary issues, like hunger strikes, the right of Republican prisoners for polit-
ical status, or show trials. For one march organizer, indeed,
 
some of my better memories of the march have been when we pinpointed other
human rights issues. Which we often did. . . . one year we did the Birmingham Six.
And that’s . . . I suppose I wouldn’t use the word enjoyment but I got more out of
that march that year I think than any other time. The whole buildup, the political
issue, the Birmingham Six is a really hot issue at the time as well. . . . There is a
great sense that we were really doing something . . . that this march wasn’t about
remembering what happened on Bloody Sunday in campaigning for it . . . but it
was also about how others have been wrongly affected by the conflict.
 
From the early 1990s, too, with the Northern Ireland peace process and the Bloody
Sunday Justice Campaign to reopen the British inquiry, a new emphasis on negotia-
tion developed. Also in the 1990s, the march increasingly situated the 1972 events
and their aftermath as part of a broader, global story of oppression and challenges
to domination (Conway 2003, 2005).
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DISCUSSION
 
All this might suggest that the only way bodily memory can be consequential is if
we understand the body as another sort of text, a genre of representation, a weak
embodiment thesis at best. Against this, proponents of the strong embodiment the-
sis might be inclined to argue that, in focusing on the ways social life is primarily
“inscribed,” we continue to express the false consciousness and bodily dissociation
of the intellectual, and understanding embodied memory—indeed, embodiment in
general—remains fundamental to any future inquiries about collective memory.
More productive than either of these alternatives, we would argue, would be to nar-
row and specify the strong embodiment thesis, opening up for investigation the cir-
cumstances and ways in which bodily memory might occasionally influence textual
memory, and vice versa.
It is helpful to begin to think through the conditions under which embodied
memory is important by considering how embodiment might be relevant to the
three issues Olick and Robbins (1998) identify as central in social memory studies—
identity, contestation, and transmission.
First, the arguments about bodily memory clearly sensitize us to one way group
identities are sometimes constituted—processes we have tended more often to
think of in terms of disembodied narrative and other discursive and symbolic forms.
The key question here, though, is this. Under what conditions will bodily memory—
such as the Korean migrant’s experience of kimchi, the Dublin 
 
flâneur
 
’s involuntary
somatic memory of repressed history, or our respondents’ occasional reports of the
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way visceral memories “come flooding back” during the march—make the transi-
tion C. Wright Mills (1959:8) characterized as that between “personal troubles” and
“public issues”? Even a large aggregate of individuals with the same incorporated
memories would not seem to be important to 
 
collective
 
 memory, unless those mem-
ories were mutually symbolized, inscribed in suitable genre, and, perhaps, mobi-
lized in memory politics (Smelser 2004:48).
 
9
 
 
If these broader conditions for the performance of group memory are present,
though, the interactional sharing of embodied memory may indeed heighten and
sustain some forms of identity by comparison to others where memory is more
purely discursive. In one of the most persuasive phenomenologically influenced
theories of embodiment, Frank identifies communicative potential for recognition
as one type of body use in action. In some circumstances, embodied experience may
significantly enhance narrative communication: “What communicative bodies are
about is the capacity for recognition which is enhanced through the sharing of nar-
ratives which are fully embodied. . . . It is when narratives are spoken from the
experience of the body that they can be shared most readily” (Frank 1991:89). So,
for instance, although Bloody Sunday was one among many related events of the
time, we could hypothesize that this particular event later became one of the central
memories of the Troubles precisely because of the heightening performative power
of the embodied memory in the commemorative march. Focused comparison of
similar groups or events varying only in whether or not 
 
embodied
 
 memories are
central and public would, then, be one way to narrow and specify the strong embod-
iment thesis. 
Second, similar strategies of conceptualization and research design would help
specify the significance of the strong embodiment thesis for contestation and col-
lective memory. Beyond the question of whether and when embodied memory
could heighten and sustain collective identities in general lies the question of
whether and how embodied memory might function in memory contestation.
Studies like those of Lee on the elderly Koreans and Stoller on Songhay spirit pos-
session argue that embodied memory is 
 
itself
 
 a relatively neglected 
 
form
 
 of collec-
tively understood contestation, preserving a sense of the past that conflicts with
dominant constructions. However, as we have argued above, the mindful body’s
memory, critical or not, does require some form of collective inscription and mobi-
lization to become more than “personal troubles,” even if such inscription exists
only in the form of oral history for the very powerless. But if views that embodied
memory can be a 
 
form
 
 of contestation seem too solipsistic, the question of whether
it is an underestimated 
 
resource
 
 for explicit, inscribed, organized contestation is
worth exploring. Are rhetorical forms and performative genres that—to some ex-
tent—appeal to or build on embodied memory, like the Bloody Sunday march,
likely to be more effective tools in the politics of memory? Again, focused compar-
isons could help answer this question. It would be important, however, to distin-
guish between the use of bodies as 
 
symbols
 
 of political support—the point of
march attendance for many of our respondents quoted above—and the potentially
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improved capacity for mobilization and claims making that might be generated be-
cause of the experiential and communicative power of “narratives . . . spoken from
the experience of the body.”
 
10
 
 
The third theme of sociological work on collective memory is the issue of its mal-
leability or persistence in intergenerational transmission (Olick and Robbins
1998:128–30). Connerton’s argument suggests that bodily memory is a neglected
source of persistence in collective memories. On this account, incorporated memory
is less constrained by cultural genre and instrumental cultural production than in-
scribed memory: because it is implicit, it may be more difficult to censor, discipline,
or challenge, and thus more resilient. On the other hand, and contrary to Connerton’s
argument, performativity may involve inbuilt change; incorporated memory in such
rituals as commemorative marches will vary because they are never done exactly the
same way twice. Indeed, on Alexander’s more elaborated theory of social perfor-
mance, the memories reproduced and emergent in such performance will be highly
contingent. How much and how incorporated memory encourages malleability or
persistence remains an open question that sociologists and historians of collective
memory will need to address in more empirical and theoretical depth than anthropo-
logically grounded studies and phenomenologically grounded theories have yet
accomplished. As discussed above, however, the ways that organizational and discur-
sive conditions generate both embodied, experiential memory of Bloody Sunday and
variant interpretations of its meaning suggest that embodied memory will be more
malleable than persistent.
The persistence of embodied collective memories across generations seems espe-
cially problematic. Whereas the Korean migrants’ grandchildren no longer find
kimchi so significant to their identity (as one would also expect, given Schuman and
Scott’s [1989] findings about generational differences in American memory), the
Songhay apparently transmit historical experience going back centuries in the
embodiment of spirit possession. There seem to be two sorts of mechanisms by which
such transmission might be achieved. One might be more strictly “bodily”—the sort
of preconscious inculcation of identity markers as occurs, for instance, with gender
(see, e.g., Young 2002). Given the tectonic shifts in forms of memory noted above,
however, it is hard to imagine that this sort of transmission would remain in our
time purely doxic (Bourdieu 1977): even preconscious bodily memories seem likely
to be culturally thematized as orthodoxy or heterodoxy by someone somewhere.
Lee does not tell us about Korean entrepreneurs or social clubs in Japan importing
and promoting authentic kimchi, but it seems likely they exist. And as we have
seen, too, embodied memory of Bloody Sunday is heavily laden with prior organi-
zational and cultural work. So intergenerational transmission of collective memory
through purely preconscious inculcation of bodily habits seems unlikely.
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The second sort of mechanism by which transmission of bodily memories would
occur would require their integration in—inscription in—
 
genres
 
 that allow their in-
culcation and repetition across generations. Stoller’s spirit possession would seem a
case in point. Unlike most existing research on embodied memory, Stoller’s case
does indeed involve memory transmission across generations. But here, and contrary
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to his argument, it seems that it is inscription in a distinctive and flexible performa-
tive genre that is the fundamental condition for transmitting repeated bodily expe-
riences. So mechanisms by which embodied memories might be transmitted seem
linked to processes of inscription: understanding intergenerational transmission of
embodied collective memory seems to require a deeper understanding of the ways
inscribed memory might generate embodied memories and a return to the sort of
cultural analysis that Stoller and Connerton reject.
 
12
 
 
In the Bloody Sunday case, as we saw briefly above, the memory lives with many
young people, and children carrying crosses are a familiar part of the march. As one
respondent said: “I would have been on the first march in a pram. . . . I was born after
Bloody Sunday. . . . It was actually part of family life. We would always have at-
tended it. . . . I come from a republican family.” Yet there is little indication that the
embodied performance of the march plays any more significant a role in this trans-
mission than the collective conversation generated by the organizational work of
memory entrepreneurs, than the TV stories of the new inquiry, than the new mu-
seum, or, especially, the related films. A number of respondents spoke critically, and
at length, of the two Bloody Sunday movies and their “role in shaping the narrative
in people’s minds.” The embodied experience of the march again seems to be only
one small part of the organized and inscribed collective memory. Moreover, several
key participants wonder whether the annual commemorative march will continue
beyond the expected report of the Saville Inquiry, through new political contexts:
“The march was a means to an end. If we get that end then we don’t need the means
any more. . . . Other people have a different point of view. I know some people
would like to see the march go on every year.” 
Theoretically, then, the question of the persistence, change, or loss of collective
memories over generations and through changing historical contexts brings an em-
phasis on embodied experience into sharpest contradiction with a more traditional
emphasis on discourse and organization. Again, the neglected question of the 
 
rela-
tions between
 
 inscribed and embodied memory seems crucial. For instance, could
media highlighting of Bloody Sunday history encourage new generations to con-
tinue the tradition of commemorative march participation, generating eventually a
form of preconscious, embodied memory from a broader organizational and discur-
sive context? More broadly, under what conditions could embodied memory really
be transmitted, extending its impact in time and space? 
These sorts of questions are generated when we begin to wonder about the impli-
cations of “incorporated memory” for sociological and historical work in social
memory studies, but such questions have not been addressed because existing work
draws too sharp a dichotomy between processes of inscription and processes of em-
bodiment. Our aim here has been to open the topic for reflection by exploring the
case for the importance of embodiment, assessing its limitations, and suggesting how
insights from embodiment theory may be examined in more focused ways in future
studies of collective memory and identity, collective memory and contestation, and
the persistence or malleability of collective memories. 
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In our view, sociological theories of collective memory including insights from
theories of embodiment will need to make two further moves. First, the level of anal-
ysis should be shifted from the individual’s embodied experience to the interactional
situation (broadly conceived), along the lines suggested by Collins (2004:chap. 2), in
his recent theory of embodied processes of mutual focus and entrainment in interac-
tion ritual chains (see also Goodwin 2000). This move would help avoid the some-
what solipsistic tendencies of an exclusive focus on the body itself. Second, though,
such theories will require a further move, or a return, to examining cultural pro-
cesses at a level of analysis beyond the individual and the interactional situation. The
arguments against the significance of discourse evident in theories of embodiment
seriously limit their explanatory power, because embodied experience is itself always
shaped within preexisting discursive fields. As we have argued, for instance, embod-
ied memory in the Bloody Sunday commemorative march is deeply conditioned by
elaborate preexisting interpretation and definition of the situation. Cultural categories,
symbols, and genre define situations within which embodied experience, including em-
bodied memory, is meaningful.
 
CONCLUSION
 
The strong embodiment thesis, that incorporated experience is a crucial site of collec-
tive memory, has become increasingly important as a focus of collective memory
scholarship. Connerton’s widely cited argument for embodied memory—and against
a focus on discursive forms—is theoretically subtle and empirically wide ranging, and
many have clearly found it productive as a sensitizing theory. Because of its influence,
and because sociologists have so far focused mostly on discursive and textual forms of
collective memory, this challenge to the importance of the discursive and the textual
deserves closer attention.
We have argued that, although this perspective does indeed illuminate aspects of
social memory that have been neglected, incorporated memory plays a much less
central role than Connerton and those who follow him wish to claim. Theoretically,
the strong embodiment thesis is limited because (1) the sharp distinction Connerton
wishes to draw between informal, performative social memory and formal, inscribed
history cannot be sustained; (2) even leaving aside the issue of formal history, Con-
nerton overemphasizes repeated ceremonial performance at the expense of more in-
formal oral history or collective conversation; (3) he invokes an overly reductionist
notion of performativity focused on bodily habit; and (4) he underestimates the ambi-
guity in embodied, habitual performance. Because it absolutizes the distinction
between embodied memory and textual memory, Connerton’s strong embodiment
thesis offers no way to understand the complex reciprocal relations between inscrip-
tion, organization, and symbolization, on the one hand, and embodied, habitual
memory, on the other. When we consider the potential impact of inscribed memory
on embodied memory, the latter seems to play a much less central role than Conner-
ton’s widely cited theory would suggest. 
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The Bloody Sunday commemorative march, held for more than thirty years in
Derry, illustrates these theoretical issues, even though there are several reasons to
think that this might be a strong case for theorists of embodied memory. Although
this case study is simply an illustration, our observations will likely sound familiar to
any student of collective memory in contemporary societies. The origins, develop-
ment, and change of the Bloody Sunday commemorative march are driven by dis-
course and debate. 
First, and as one might expect, the immediate experience is rapidly inserted into
preexisting discursive frameworks and repertoires of contention supported with
long-standing organizational resources. There is no strong boundary between formal
history and informal memory practices because the events of 1972 are always al-
ready inscribed in discursive frameworks with deep roots in formalized, textualized
histories. Second, organized, preinscribed events generate not only embodied mem-
ory but collective conversation—an agenda-setting process that escapes Connerton’s
categories, even though he sometimes sees oral history as the sort of informal mem-
ory he wishes to counterpose against formal history. Third, the performativity of the
Bloody Sunday commemorative march involves much more than the embodiment
Connerton emphasizes. Connerton overestimates the significance of the actors’
“body-self” as an experiential and representational carrier of collective memory in
performance. Alexander’s (2004) broader theory of ritual performance—and in par-
ticular the emphasis on shared symbolic codes and means of symbolic production—
accounts for much more of what we see in the history of the march, and the persis-
tence of the Bloody Sunday memory. Fourth, the social memory expressed in em-
bodied performance is not unambiguous and transparent but multidimensional, con-
flicted, and changing. The supposedly transparent habitual performance of the
march allows for enormous ambiguity that Connerton cannot theorize. At any given
time, the meanings of the march are multiple and contested: competing meanings,
grounded in discursive oppositions between peace and violence, constitutional and
armed struggle, remembrance and political claim, are mobilized by different mem-
ory entrepreneurs, march organizers, commentators, and participants. And the
meanings of the embodied practices embedded in the Bloody Sunday march shift
frequently over a few decades, according to contemporary concerns.
With these considerations in mind, we have suggested that insights from theories
of embodied collective memory may be better developed in focused comparative
studies that examine the ways bodily memory and textual memory may influence
each other in constituting group identities, in the cultural politics of memory, and in
change, persistence, and intergenerational transmission.
 
Acknowledgments:
 
This article is based on research first presented at the Confer-
ence on Collective Memory and Symbolic Interaction at Northwestern University in
June 2004, sponsored by Northwestern University’s Weinberg College of Arts and
Sciences, the Department of Sociology, and the Society for the Study of Symbolic
 100
 
Symbolic Interaction
 
Volume 30, Number 1, 2007
 
Interaction. Thanks to Gary Fine and Aaron Beim for creating this stimulating event
and to the participants for their helpful reactions. Audiences at the World Congress
of the International Institute of Sociology in Stockholm in July 2005 and the Annual
Meeting of the American Sociological Association in Philadelphia in August 2005
also helped shape our arguments. Thanks especially to Gary Fine, Andreas Glaeser,
Russell Faeges, and anonymous reviewers for detailed comments, and to informants
in Derry for their generosity in sharing their experiences and observations.
 
NOTES
 
1. For a sense of the theoretical advances in this area, see the discussions in Budgeon 2003, Freund
2001, Halton 1992, Howson 2004, Newton 2003, Skultans 1999, Williams 2003, and Witz and
Marshall 2003. See also the wide range of issues opened up in the journal 
 
Body and Society
 
.
2. Of course, we also study the ways extension in time and space might be limited by the funda-
mentally political production-of-culture dynamics that make resistance, apathy, and counter-
memory an inherent dimension of any collective memory itself (Spillman 1997, 2003), as well as
by different generational experiences (Schuman and Scott 1989).
3. This was the thirty-year period of violence involving loyalist and republican paramilitary orga-
nizations and the British state over competing claims to the six counties of Northern Ireland.
This summary is drawn from Conway 2003, which provides more historical context and ana-
lyzes changing themes in the popular memory of the event. The full study (Conway 2005) draws
on the complete range of archival and media evidence generated by the event since 1972, as
well as interviews and ethnography, and examines variation in meaning making both within and
between vernacular and official interpretation and organization.
4. As Gary Fine has pointed out, the distinction here is between emphasizing the body as experi-
enced in the world “from inside out” and viewing the body as an object, from “outside in” (personal
communication, June 4, 2004). Many theorists of embodiment challenge social constructionism
more generally on the basis that “the embodied self exceeds representation” (Budgeon
2003:51), along the lines of the strong embodiment thesis about collective memory.
5. Unless otherwise noted, quotations are drawn from thirty-one semistructured interviews con-
ducted in 2004 with participants in the annual march, including relatives of victims, former
activists, and community workers and leaders. Newton (2003:31), in his critique of one type of
embodiment argument, raises the interesting methodological question of “how we can ‘inter-
view’ the body.” Our strategy here was to attend to when and where more intensified and concrete
accounts of experiences emerged in lengthy and wide-ranging interviews. Norms of relevance
that might downplay reports of physical experience could mean that the frequency of embodied,
experiential memory in the commemorative march is understated in this example. Neverthe-
less, both the variation in our interviews and the frequency of informants’ interpretations coun-
tering the strong embodiment thesis make us confident that the questions we raise here using
this illustration are important ones for future work on embodied memory. 
6. See also Kertzer’s neglected 
 
Ritual, Politics, and Power
 
 (1988), which analyzes “the virtues of
ambiguity” in ritual (chap. 4).
7. This informant also describes increasing radicalization in the late 1960s and early 1970s: “And I
realized . . . something significant had changed. These people had seen these things on televi-
sion of being batoned, very brutally, and that set a spark and the spark was starting to just
burn.” The perception of media influence is also relevant to our argument here.
8. Global parallels with other subordinate groups were drawn in the 1990s commemorations even
though, as one informant observed, “some of these parallels [such as with apartheid] are abso-
lutely fanciful and insulting to the people we draw parallels with.”
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9. So, for instance, Kleinman and Kleinman (1994:714, 720) conclude in their important study of
embodied memory in the aftermath of China’s Cultural Revolution that although victims’
“narratives of sickness” linked “bodily memory, biography, and social history,” embodied memory
was “both personally and socially unavailing,” remaining, in Mills’s terms, a matter of “personal
troubles.” On this basis, they criticize theorists who “avoid the question of what processes mediate/
transform the social and the corporal” (p. 710). Recent discussions of cultural trauma also empha-
size, against naturalistic and psychologistic understandings, that suffering does not become
trauma unless it is culturally and institutionally mediated (Alexander et al. 2004; see also Kenny
1999). However, for a sophisticated analysis of a case in which bodily memory does indeed be-
come “public” dissent, see Skultans 1999 on illness in the interpretation of the Soviet past in
Latvia. An interesting and potentially important set of cases for scholars of collective memory to
pursue these issues comparatively would be cases of the memory of war (e.g., comparing the vari-
ous sites of memory discussed in Evans and Lunn 1997, various wars within one country, and the
same war in different countries). When does the embodied memory of military service and war-
inflicted corporeal disability become “public” rather than “personal” memory?
10. Alternatively, however, and against the strong embodiment thesis, inscribed memory may
evoke and legitimate embodied memory, as seems to be occurring for some our respondents
quoted above. Indeed, against Connerton, embodied memory may be provisional until in-
scribed. This may account for the importance attached to the Saville Inquiry, which reexamined
five hundred eyewitness accounts collected by civil rights associations and set aside by the 1972
Widgery report. As may also be the case in other recent truth commissions and inquiries, in-
scribed, official history is seen here as giving “a voice back to the victims” (Gibbons 1998:108).
11. Although Bourdieu’s (1977:87) discussion of body 
 
hexis
 
 as a means by which “schemes are able
to pass from practice to practice without going through discourse or consciousness” might seem
to justify the idea that preconscious inculcation of bodily habit transmits collective memories
across generations, he sees this process as important only when “the work of education is not
clearly institutionalized as a specific, autonomous practice.” Even where cultural production is
not differentiated and institutionalized in this way, there is always a dialectical relationship be-
tween embodied practice and mental structures or cultural schema (pp. 87–95).
12. Inscribed memory seems even more important if we are concerned with long-lasting collective
memories, instances in which collective memories appear to persist over centuries (on the gen-
eral question of long-lasting cultural forms, see Swidler 1992). An important condition for per-
sistence through generations and through very different political instrumental contexts seems
to be fundamentally cultural—semiotic openness (Spillman 2003). Arguably, the spirit posses-
sion ritual genre is open in this way, allowing the integration of new historical experiences with
the invention of new spirit groups and the acting out of new social issues by existing spirits. 
 
Persistence of collective memories across generations might also be accomplished in the experi-
ential constraints imposed by spatiotemporal organization. This possibility is suggested by
Freund’s (2001) defense of the “social model” of disability against those who criticize it as too
disembodied, although he is not specifically concerned with collective memory issues.
 
REFERENCES
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2004. “Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy.”
 
Sociological Theory
 
 22(4):527–73.
Alexander, Jeffrey C., Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka. 2004.
 
Cultural Trauma and Collecti
 
v
 
e Identity
 
. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. 
 
Outline of a Theory of Practice
 
, translated by R. Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Boyle, Seamus. 1978. 
 
Republican News
 
, February 4, p. 6.
Bryan, Dominic. 2000. 
 
Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual
 
. London: Pluto.
Budgeon, Shelley. 2003. “Identity as an Embodied Event.” 
 
Body and Society
 
 9(1):35–55.
 102
 
Symbolic Interaction
 
Volume 30, Number 1, 2007
 
Burton, Frank. 1978. 
 
The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles of a Belfast Community
 
. London:
Routledge.
Collins, Randall. 2004. 
 
Interaction Ritual Chains
 
. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Connerton, Paul. 1989. 
 
How Societies Remember
 
. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Conway, Brian. 2003. “Active Remembering, Selective Forgetting, and Collective Identity: The
Case of Bloody Sunday.” 
 
Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research
 
 3:305–23.
———. 2005. “Texts, Bodies, and Commemoration: Bloody Sunday (1972) as a Case Study.” Ph.D.
diss., University of Notre Dame. 
Dayan, Daniel and Elihu Katz. 1992. 
 
Media E
 
v
 
ents: The Li
 
ve Broadcasting of History. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Derry Journal. 1973. “Pleas for Dignified Bloody Sunday Commemoration.” January 28, p. 1.
———. 1974. Public Notices. January 15.
Evans, Martin and Ken Lunn. 1997. War and Memory in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Berg.
Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2001. Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can
Succeed Again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frank, Arthur W. 1991. “For a Sociology of the Body: An Analytical Review.” Pp. 36–102 in The
Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory, edited by M. Featherstone, M. Hepworth, and
B. S. Turner. London: Sage.
Freund, Peter. 2001. “Bodies, Disabilities, and Spaces: The Social Model and Disabling Spatial
Organisations.” Disability and Society 16:689–706.
Gartner, Joelle. 1998. “Anger at the Heel: The Legacy of Bloody Sunday.” Pp. 117–31 in Hidden
Truths: Bloody Sunday 1972, edited by T. Ziff. Santa Monica, CA: Smart Art.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture.” Pp. 3–30
in The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Gibbons, Luke. 1998. “History without the Talking Cure: Bloody Sunday as ‘Modern Event.’”
Pp. 101–9 in Hidden Truths: Bloody Sunday 1972, edited by T. Ziff. Santa Monica, CA:
Smart Art.
———. 2001. “Where Wolfe Tone’s Statue Was Not: Joyce, Monuments, and Memory.” Pp. 139–59
in History and Memory in Modern Ireland, edited by I. McBride. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Glassie, Henry. 1982. Passing the Time in Ballymenone: Culture and History of an Ulster Commu-
nity. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Goodwin, Charles. 2000. “Action and Embodiment within Situated Human Interaction.” Journal
of Pragmatics 32:1489–522.
Halton, Eugene. 1992. “The Cultic Roots of Culture.” Pp. 29–63 in Theory of Culture, edited by R.
Munch and N. J. Smelser. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Howson, Alexandra. 2004. The Body in Society. Cambridge: Polity.
Igarashi, Yoshikuni. 2000. Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture,
1945–1970. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jarman, Neil. 1997. Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland. Oxford:
Berg.
Kelleher, W. F. 2003. The Troubles in Ballybogoin: Memory and Identity in Ballybogoin. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Kenny, Michael G. 1999. “A Place for Memory: The Interface between Individual and Collective
Memory.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41:420–37.
Kertzer, David. 1988. Ritual, Politics, and Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kleinman, Arthur and Joan Kleinman. 1994. “How Bodies Remember: Social Memory and Bodily
Experience of Criticism, Resistance, and Delegitimation Following China’s Cultural Revo-
lution.” New Literary History 25:707–23.
Lee, Sandra S.-J. 2000. “Dys-appearing Tongues and Bodily Memories: The Aging of First-Gener-
ation Resident Koreans in Japan.” Ethos 28:198–223.
Mead, George H. 1962. Mind, Self, and Society. Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. London: Oxford University Press.
Texts, Bodies, and the Memory of Bloody Sunday 103
Newton, Tim. 2003. “Truly Embodied Sociology: Marrying the Sociological and the Biological?”
Sociological Review 51:20–42.
Olick, Jeffrey K. and Joyce Robbins. 1998. “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to
Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices.” Annual Review of Sociology 24:105–40.
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy and Margaret M. Lock. 1987. “The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to
Future Work in Medical Anthropology.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly, n.s., 1:6–41.
Schumann, Howard and Jacqueline Scott. 1989. “Generations and Collective Memory.” American
Sociological Review 54:359–81.
Schwartz, Barry. 2005. “The New Gettysburg Address: Fusing History and Memory.” Special issue,
“Cultural Sociology and Sociological Publics,” edited by M. Jacobs and L. Spillman. Poetics
33:63–79. 
Skultans, Vieda. 1999. “Narratives of the Body and History: Illness in Judgment on the Soviet
Past.” Sociology of Health and Illness 21:310–28.
Smelser, Neil. 2004. “Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma.” Pp. 31–59 in Cultural Trauma
and Collective Identity, edited by J. Alexander et al. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Spillman, Lyn. 1997. Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States
and Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2003. “When Do Collective Memories Last? Founding Moments in the United States and
Australia.” Pp. 161–92 in States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in
National Retrospection, edited by J. K. Olick. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Stoller, Paul. 1994. “Embodying Colonial Memories.” American Anthropologist, n.s., 96:634–48.
———. 1997. Sensuous Scholarship. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Sunday World. 1978. LHNIPC, NIO Cuttings Files, Londonderry Civil Rights March. January 29.
Linenhall Northern Ireland Political Collection, Belfast. 
Swidler, Ann. 1992. “Inequality and American Culture: The Persistence of Voluntarism.” Pp. 294–
314 in Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset, edited by G.
Marks and L. Diamond. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Turner, Bryan S. 1984. The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 1991. “Recent Developments in the Theory of the Body.” Pp. 1–35 in The Body: Social
Process and Cultural Theory, edited by M. Featherstone, M. Hepworth, and B. S. Turner.
London: Sage.
Waters, Mary. 1990. Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Williams, Simon. 2003. “Marrying the Social and the Biological? A Rejoinder to Newton.” Sociological
Review 51:550–61.
Witz, Anne and Barbara L. Marshall. 2003. “The Quality of Manhood: Masculinity and Embodiment
in the Sociological Tradition.” Sociological Review 51:339–56.
Young, Katherine. 2002. “The Memory of the Flesh: The Family Body in Somatic Psychology.”
Body and Society 8(3):25–47.

